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ABSTRACT
Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance.  Final
offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the
police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one.  In the months after New
Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime
reports rise relative to when they win.  These declines are larger when the awarded wage is further
from the police union's demand.  The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness,
disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.
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While much of our understanding of labor markets derives from the idea that workers 
respond to incentives, an important theoretical literature stresses psychological and non-market 
factors as determinants of employee performance.
1  There is growing evidence that employees are 
less satisfied not just with low pay, but with pay below a reference or “fair” wage.
2  Although there is 
provocative evidence from laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gachter [2000]), there is little field 
evidence about whether these deviations also reduce productivity.  This paper assesses the 
relationship between pay raises, anticipated pay raises, and employee performance in an actual labor 
market. 
Final offer arbitration of wage disputes provides an attractive real-world laboratory to 
investigate how on-the-job performance of labor market participants responds to changes in 
compensation relative to a reference point.  In final offer arbitration (FOA), disputing parties submit 
offers to an arbitrator who is constrained to choose one of the disputant’s offers in a binding 
settlement.  Final offer arbitration is commonly employed in public sector unions.  I employ a dataset 
containing information on final offer arbitration cases involving compensation disputes between New 
Jersey police bargaining units and municipalities in the years between 1978 and 1996.  After 
matching the arbitration data to monthly measures of police effectiveness by jurisdiction, I test 
whether police performance depends on the arbitration outcome and, when arbitrators rule against the 
union, the size of the loss incurred.   
There are several reasons why arbitration systems are attractive for this study.  First, because 
there is often divergence between what the union asked for and what they actually received, I can 
assess the effect of deviations of awarded pay from pay demands on productivity.  Second, 
arbitration rulings have a surprise component, as the arbitrator’s preferred award may be unknown.  
In fact, the equilibrium outcome in standard theories of final offer arbitration—for example Farber 
                                                 
1 A prominent example is the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990]. 
2 Adams [1965] is a classic study on equity theory that experimentally links higher pay with higher effort.  More 
recently, surveys of employers suggest that deviations from reference wages affect worker morale and that managers  
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[1980]—is for the arbitrator to select the winning party at random.  This is because the offers the 
disputing parties submit to the arbitrator serve as sufficient statistics for information relevant to 
police compensation.  Consistent with this prediction, I cannot reject that cities in which the 
arbitrator ruled against the unit have the same municipal level characteristics as cities where the 
arbitrator ruled in its favor.  The empirical strategy employed in this paper, however, is robust to 
violations of this condition, as it allows for differences in pre-arbitration levels of police 
effectiveness and for permanent unobserved heterogeneity of bargaining units and their employers. 
Police performance declines sharply when officers lose arbitrations.   The per capita number 
of crimes cleared (solved) by arrest are 12 percent higher in the months following arbitration when 
arbitrators ruled in favor of the police officers, relative to when arbitrators ruled for the municipal 
employer.  Felony arrests in cities where police unions lost are also associated with lower 
incarceration probabilities and shorter jail sentences, even after conditioning on detailed charged 
crime categories, suggesting that police may reduce their cooperation with prosecutors following 
arbitration losses.  Additionally, I show that union losses are associated with a 5.5 percent increase in 
reported crime rates in the months following arbitration decisions.   
The degree to which an arbitration decision is considered a win or a loss may depend on 
employee expectations upon entering arbitration.  Numerous laboratory experiments provide 
evidence that utility depends not only on actual outcomes, but also on what could have occurred in a 
different state of the world [Bateman et al. 1997; Mellers, Schwartz and Ritov 1999; Thaler 1980].  
This idea has been posited in numerous paper from the theoretical literature [Gul 1991; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Koszegi and Rabin 2005].  While the experimental literature offers important 
evidence that effort depends on a worker’s pay relative to a reference point, there are few studies 
addressing this question using market data.
3   
                                                                                                                                                             
are reluctant to lower wages [Bewley 1999; Blinder and Choi 1990; Kaufman 1984; Agell and Lunborg 1995].  
Brown et al. [2005] present survey and experimental evidence that relative pay matters for employee satisfaction.   
3 Two studies addressing this question are Cappelli and Chauvin [1991] and Verhoogen et al. [2003].  Both studies 
use variation in local labor market conditions in the location of plants within firms to test whether plants located in 
areas with better economic conditions experience lower dismissal rates.  Both studies find a moderate relationship  
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I find that police performance depends on the awarded pay raise relative to expectations.  The 
change in performance of police officers following an arbitration loss depends not only on the 
amount of the pay raise, but on the counter-offer that was demanded but never implemented as well.  
Therefore, comparisons of pay raises to counterfactuals influence police effort when they lose.  By 
contrast, counterfactual comparisons are not relevant when police win in arbitration, signifying that 
these workers are prone to a form of loss aversion.  On the whole, these results highlight the 
importance of managing and, in particular, lowering employee expectations prior to manipulating 
wage policy in organizations.    
     
II.  Conceptual Framework of Final-Offer Arbitration 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to review the context surrounding the arbitration cases under 
analysis, as well as to outline a conceptual framework of final offer arbitration.  Between 1978 and 
1996 the default procedure for dispute resolution between police bargaining units and their 
employers in New Jersey was final offer arbitration.
4  Beginning in 1968, public sector employees in 
New Jersey were allowed to engage in collective bargaining but were not allowed to strike in cases 
where negotiations failed.  As a result, many negotiations were drawn out, often resolved well-after 
the date of the contract.  To remedy this problem, arbitration was legislated in 1977 specifying the 
procedure by which such impasses would be resolved.  The New Jersey Fire and Police Arbitration 
Act mandated that collective bargaining must be initiated 120 days prior to the contract expiration 
date, and, if an agreement was not reached 60 days before that date, parties must begin arbitration 
proceedings.  Between 1976 and 1996, approximately nine percent of contract expirations of police 
officers resulted in arbitration over salary demands.   
Salient questions in the theoretical analysis of FOA are whether parties in dispute can reach 
an agreement before arbitration, what the determinants of the final offers are if the parties cannot 
reach an agreement, and how the arbitrator rules given the final offers.  In traditional theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                             
between local labor market conditions and the extent of dismissals and absenteeism.  Rizzo and Zeckhauser [2003] 
find that target incomes are a good predictor of future hourly earnings of physicians, but not of hours worked.       
4 Ashenfelter and Dahl [2005] and Lester [1984] review public sector dispute resolution procedures in New Jersey.   
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models of FOA, the arbitrator rules in favor of the party whose offer is nearest to his or her preferred 
award.  Farber’s [1980] insight is that from the point of view of the disputants, the arbitrator’s 
preferred award is stochastic.  Therefore, the parties in dispute will make their decision under 
uncertainty and choose offers that maximize their expected utility.  To make the model concrete, I 
present the basic setup of Farber’s [1980] model of final offer arbitration.
5  While this model may not 
be a literal description of reality, it provides a useful framework for thinking about the problem 
negotiating parties face in arbitration.       
Denote  a r  as the arbitrator’s preferred pay raise,  e r as the employer’s proposed pay raise,  u r  
as the union’s proposed pay raise, and w as the wage from the previous contract.  A simple decision 
rule for the arbitrator is to select the employer’s offer if  | | | | u a e a r r r r − ≤ − .  While disputing parties 
do not observe  a r , they do know its distribution, which by the arbitrator exchangeability condition 
has a common distribution for all arbitrators.
6  The “facts” of the case enter into the model through 
the mean,µ , of  a r .  If the police are relatively productive and they deserve a sizable pay raise, then 
µ  will be large, but how large depends on how the population of arbitrators value performance.  
Under the assumption that the arbitrator rules in favor of the party whose offer is closest to his or her 
preferred award, disputing parties select offers that will maximize their expected utility, given the 
offer of the opposing party, by trading off the probability of winning in arbitration and the resulting 
payoff.  Denoting P as the probability that the arbitrator rules in favor of the employer, the expected 
utility for the employer and union respectively is:    
 
EU( e r , u r )=P*U( w re ∗ + ) 1 ( )+(1-P)*U( w ru ∗ + ) 1 ( ), 
EV( e r , u r )=P*V( w re ∗ + ) 1 ( )+(1-P)*V( w ru ∗ + ) 1 ( ). 
 
                                                 
5 Another classic model of FOA, developed by Gibbons [1988], in which the arbitrator learns from the proposed 
offers, will lead to similar intuitions. 
6 Ashenfelter [1987] notes that since, generally, parties must each agree on the arbitrator in FOA, if arbitrators value 
work they will ensure that their decisions are unpredictable but drawn from the same distribution as other arbitrators.  
This feature of the theory of FOA is called arbitrator exchangeability.  
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The solution concept for this model is Nash equilibrium, whereby both parties choose offers 
such that neither party can achieve higher expected utility by changing it.  Three predictions of the 
model are that: 
 
(i)  If disputing parties are equally risk-averse, the winner in arbitration is determined by a 
coin toss.   
   
(ii) If parties exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the arbitrator will be more likely to rule 
in favor of the more risk-averse party.  However, the probability of an employer win is 
fixed, and is therefore invariant to the facts of the case.
7  
 
(iii) The offer spread ( u r - e r ) is a function of σ , the uncertainty about the arbitrator’s    
       preferred award.  
 
   
Prediction (i) can be understood by recognizing that information from the case that the 
arbitrator uses to make a decision is taken into account in the disputants’ final offers.  The arbitrator 
selects an offer based on forecast error that is uncorrelated to the facts of the case.  If the union is 
more risk-averse than the employer, then prediction (ii) implies that while we may not observe an 
equal proportion of wins for police and employers in the data, cities where police won and lost in 
arbitration should not be systematically different.  In Section IV, I offer evidence that arbitrator 
rulings are in fact orthogonal to the facts of the case.  Prediction (iii) implies that as the arbitrator’s 
preferred award becomes more unpredictable, the offer spread increases.   
  The model is silent as to why disputes ever reach arbitration.  If parties know the distribution 
of the arbitrator’s preferred award then they should settle at the mean of the award distribution.  
However, if disputants have divergent beliefs regarding the population distribution of arbitrator 
awards or experience mental rigidity in negotiations, then there may be an incentive to enter into 
arbitration proceedings.  Under these scenarios, there may be variation in the likelihood that the 
employer is selected, depending on the size of the offers.  For example, the model described above 
can be easily modified to allow parties to observe the true µ  with measurement error.  Parties will 
submit offers that are too high or too low than would be otherwise optimal, depending on the error 
realization.  In this case, the probability that the arbitrator rules in favor of the employer will depend  
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on measurement error.  As I will discuss later, there is evidence that higher average offers are 
associated with higher probabilities of employer selection, suggesting that parties vary in the 
conservativeness of their offers.  But because there is no relationship between the arbitration outcome 
and past performance, it appears that the factors leading parties to submit more or less realistic offers 
are not systematically related to historical measures of police performance.   
 
III.  Data Sources 
Ideally, performance by police would be proxied by variables that are thought to 
unambiguously impact public welfare, for example, response times or complaints filed against police 
officers.  Unfortunately, these measures are not systematically available for police departments from 
the period analyzed in this paper.  Instead, the main measure of police performance used in this paper 
is the number of crimes cleared by arrest per 100,000 residents in a municipality.  Clearances refer to 
the number of crimes that have been “solved” by the arrest of one or more individuals.
8  In general, I 
will use the term “clearance rate” to denote the number of crimes cleared by arrest in a month per 
100,000 capita.  Police officers have discretion over the number of arrests they make through a 
number of mechanisms including overtime work, absenteeism (the “Blue Flu”), or simply through 
the share of the working day spent actively policing.      
Arrests represent costly effort for the police officers involved, due to the energy expended 
both in the act of arrest and in the subsequent paperwork.  However, under some circumstances, 
arrests could be welfare reducing, for example, if police arrest residents randomly or, perhaps, target 
minorities in a discriminatory fashion.  Nevertheless, a greater number of arrests may signal a more 
active police presence in communities and, in fact, police departments often base their own internal 
evaluations on this measure.  I will also consider measures of performance that may be more closely 
aligned to public welfare, in particular, crime rates and the sentencing outcomes of arrestees.  These 
measures will not be at the core of my analysis because of sporadic data availability in the case of 
sentencing and the extent of noise in the case of the crime rate.     
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Prediction (ii) follows from equation (8) of Farber [1980].  
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Three sources of data are used in this paper.  Information about arbitration cases and rulings 
comes from New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) documents at the New 
Jersey Department of Labor and was used in Ashenfelter and Dahl [2005].  The data describe FOA 
cases between cities and police unions in New Jersey between 1978 and 1995 and include 
information on the offers submitted to the arbitrator (which are expressed as percent changes on the 
previous contract’s wage) and information on whether the arbitrator ruled in favor of the municipal 
employer or bargaining unit.  I match arbitration cases to monthly clearance and crime data from the 
FBI Uniform Crime Reporting System (UCR) data files for 1976 through 1996.  Some of the cases 
are dropped from the analysis because they lie too close to one another, resulting in overlapping 
event-study windows.  The Data Appendix explains the sample selection criteria in more detail.  The 
resulting data set contains 383 arbitration cases from 255 different cities over salary disputes.   
I also use data from the Offender Based Transaction Statistics (OBTS).  These data track 
individuals arrested for felony crimes through the courts and, if convicted, the sentence.  The data 
allow me to test whether arrestees have differential probabilities of conviction and incarceration, as 
well as sentence length, depending on the outcome of arbitration.  A disadvantage to the OBTS data 
is that they are available for only a limited number of years.       
 
IV.  Sampling Scheme and Empirical Strategy 
The models considered in this paper are identified off of the staggered timing of the 
arbitration rulings.  Arbitration cases are staggered by year and month allowing me to estimate the 
effect of arbitration rulings on outcomes after controlling for year × month, as well as arbitration 
case-specific heterogeneity.  For each arbitration case I construct an arbitration window of length 
(N1, N2), which consists of the arbitration month, the N1 months preceding arbitration and the N2 
months following arbitration.  Initially, the analysis only includes cities that experienced arbitration 
and, for these cities, only months that are contained in the arbitration window.  I then consider 
specifications with an augmented sample, consisting of the initial sample and a comparison group of 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Clearances will differ from the number of arrests if an individual is arrested for multiple crimes or if multiple 
arrests clear one crime, although these two measures are highly correlated.    
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cities that never underwent arbitration, in order to facilitate the estimation of state-wide time patterns 
in clearances and crime.   
Because there are cities with multiple arbitration cases, I drop a number of cases, or months 
within cases, when the arbitration windows overlap.  The Data Appendix describes the rules used to 
determine inclusion into the study.  In general, there is a tradeoff between the length of the arbitration 
window and the number of arbitration cases that are used, but the findings are robust to the use of 
different lengths of the arbitration window.
  
A city in which the arbitrator ruled in favor of the police bargaining unit will be denoted as a 
“Union” city.  Likewise, a city in which the arbitrator ruled in favor of the municipal employer will 
be denoted as an “Employer” city.  In the simplest estimator, I compare the average difference in 
clearances in Union and Employer cities prior to arbitration to the average difference in clearances 
after arbitration.  This difference-in-difference estimator measures the impact of arbitration rulings 
on performance in Union cities relative to Employer cities.  In richer models, I control for time and 
arbitration window dummies and also allow for the additional comparison group of non-arbitrating 
municipalities to help estimate the time effects.   
Table I reports means of the cell-level dataset that is used in this analysis.  The first column 
presents summary statistics for the full sample, the second column summarizes the pre-arbitration 
period for cities in which the police union won in arbitration, and the third column provides pre-
arbitration information on cities in which the police union lost in arbitration.  Because cities tend to 
be small, there are relatively few monthly crimes and clearances.
9  Cities experience an average of 65 
violent crime clearances per 100,000 residents per month, amounting to approximately 14 violent 
crime clearances per month.  Because of the presence of zeros in the data, especially in narrow 
categories of crime, I chose to analyze per capita levels, rather than percentage changes or logs.   
Column (1) shows that the employers only won 34 percent of their cases.  Therefore, it does 
not appear that arbitrators are indifferent between the offers of the two parties.  However, it is 
                                                 
9 The cities under analysis have an average population of 21,345 (median of 12,331).  On average, bargaining units 
consist of 43 police officers, or about 87 percent of the police force in a given municipality.    
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possible that union negotiators are more risk-averse than city negotiators and therefore submit more 
conservative offers.  Column (4) presents the difference in means between Union and Employer 
cities in the pre-arbitration period.  Consistent with prediction (ii) of the theory of FOA described 
above, the means do not reveal much of a difference in crime rates, per capita clearances, or other 
characteristics of union win and union loss municipalities in the pre-arbitration period suggesting no 
obvious relationship between the arbitrator decision and information available to the arbitrator at the 
time of arbitration.  However, there is a relationship between the size of the offers and the probability 
of an employer win.  This relationship suggests that, conditional on the facts of the case, parties may 
submit offers of varying sizes, perhaps due to heterogeneity in risk-aversion or divergent beliefs.  On 
average, larger offers lead to a higher probability of employer selection.  But the degree to which 
offers are out-of-line with the arbitrator’s preferred award is uncorrelated with city characteristics 
prior to arbitration.   
 
V.  The Effect of Arbitration Rulings on Clearance Rates  
V. A.  Graphical Evidence 
In order to determine how arbitration outcomes affect the number of crimes cleared by arrest, 
I begin by comparing the average number of clearances in the months prior to arbitration to the 
number of clearances in the months after arbitration for Union and Employer cities.  I present these 
averages in Figure I for the grand total of clearances using a relatively long (23,23) month arbitration 
window, which has the disadvantage of excluding many arbitration rulings, but allows one to 
examine both the persistence of effects and pre-arbitration trends over a relatively long time span.
10  
The plot suggests that prior to arbitration Union and Employer cities had similar monthly clearance 
rates, but that after arbitration the clearance rates in these two types of cities diverged, with police 
forces in Union cities clearing more crimes by arrest.  This clearance rate differential appears to 
emerge around four months after arbitration, peaking at seven months, and persisting for 
approximately 22 months.  Visual inspections of Figure I reveals that Union and Employer cities do 
                                                 
10 The sample means, as in most estimates in this paper, are weighted by population of the jurisdiction in 1976.    
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not appear to have differential trends in per capita clearances prior to arbitration, something one 
would expect to see if the arbitrator incorporated trends in clearance rates as part of his or her 
decision rule even after conditioning on the final offers of the disputing parties.
11    
  By adding arbitration window and time (month × year) fixed-effects, I allow for arbitrary 
unobserved heterogeneity across arbitration windows—to hold constant permanent differences in 
clearance rates in cities around the time of arbitration—and I allow for a general time pattern in 
clearances in the state over the sample period.  In order to facilitate the estimate of the time effects, I 
include a comparison group of 197 cities that never underwent arbitration with police unions.  These 
additional cities are included in the sample for the entire 1976-1996 period.  The sample therefore 
consists of cities that underwent arbitration in months within the arbitration window and cities that 
did not undergo arbitration for all months in the 1976 to 1996 interval.   
Figure II is the regression-adjusted version of Figure I.  To construct the figure, I estimate:  
(1)  23   ,   .   .   .   -23,    , ns EmployerWi UnionWins b b FE = + ∗ + ∗ + + = τ ε β δ ψ α τ τ τ τ bc t bc t y , 
FE ψ = c b t ν γ η + + , 
 
where  bc t y τ  denotes clearances per 100,000 capita in time period t (month × year), time since 
arbitration  τ , arbitration window b, and city c.  The term  FE ψ  denotes the collection of fixed-
effects included in the model, consisting of arbitration window fixed-effects ( b γ ), month × year 
fixed-effects ( t η ), and city fixed-effects ( c ν ).  Note that the arbitration window fixed-effects absorb 
the city fixed-effects in cities that experienced arbitration, as they are specific to the time period 
around the arbitration date.  Because of the inclusion of the arbitration window fixed-effects, it is not 
possible to identify parameters  τ β  and  τ δ  for each of the months relative to arbitration.  Therefore, 
0 β  and  0 δ  are excluded from the model, and the remaining coefficients should be interpreted 
                                                 
11 Formally, I cannot reject that union win and union loss cities have the same pre-arbitration trends in clearances at 
conventional levels of significance.      
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relative to clearances in the arbitration month.  The estimated coefficients  τ β
)
 and  τ δ
)
 (τ  = -23, . . ., 
23) are plotted against event-time in Figure II.   
Figure II confirms that the pattern observed in Figure I is unaffected by regression-
adjustments.  As with the raw means, there does not appear to be a difference in the trend of monthly 
clearance rates in the pre-arbitration period, but there is a marked divergence between the union win 
and union loss municipalities in clearances after arbitration.   
  I conduct inference by estimating the cumulative effect of arbitration rulings on clearance 
rates over each of the post-arbitration months.  Using shortened (12,23) windows, in order to allow 
for more arbitration cases in the analysis, I fit the following model to the data:   
 
(2)  ,23   .   .   .   1,   , UnionLosesb FE = + ∗ + + + = τ ε θ ξ ψ α τ τ τ τ bc t bc t y .
12   
The estimate  τ θ ˆ  is the estimated gap in per capita clearances between Union and Employer cities in 
month τ  after arbitration, relative to the average gap in clearances between Union and Employer 
cities during the entire pre-arbitration period.  A negative value of  τ θ ˆ  means that the gap in the 
clearance rate between Union and Employer cities in the τ th month after arbitration is wider than the 
average gap in the clearance rate between these two groups during the entire pre-arbitration period, 
holding other things constant.  For each post-arbitration date I cumulatively add the difference-in-
difference estimates  τ θ ˆ  to obtain the total unexplained gap in the number of clearances between 
Union and Employer cities j months after arbitration:     
 




τ τ θ ω ,  j = 1, . . . , 23. 
The estimate  j ω ˆ  is the cumulative difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of winning versus 
losing arbitration rulings on clearances j months after arbitration.  
The plot of  j ω ˆ  along with a 90 percent confidence interval is presented in Figure III.   
Because there is autocorrelation in monthly clearances within municipalities, standard errors are  
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clustered within the arbitration windows.  In Figure III, the Union/Employer clearance rate gap is 
significantly larger following arbitration than in the months before arbitration.  The plotted  j ω ˆ  points 
are negative and downward sloping.  The decline in clearances in Employer municipalities relative to 
Union municipalities begins after the second month, although I cannot reject that  j ω ˆ  is significantly 
different than zero at the 10 percent level until four months after arbitration.
13  The post-arbitration 
difference in clearances between Employer and Union communities appears to persist for 
approximately one year and the cumulative difference totals to more than 225 crimes cleared by 
arrest per 100,000 capita.   
 
V. B.  Regression estimates 
Table II reports parametric regression estimates corresponding to the (12,12) arbitration 
window.  Column (1) reports the change in the clearance rate from the pre- to the post-arbitration 
period for Union and Employer cities.  As this model is regression-unadjusted, the estimates can be 
interpreted as simple differences in means.  The estimates in column (1) imply that when arbitrators 
ruled in favor of the union, police forces obtained on average 4.99 more monthly clearances per 
100,000 capita after arbitration than before arbitration.  A union loss is associated with a reduction of 
6.79 monthly clearances per 100,000 capita.  In column (2) the sample is weighted by population in 
the jurisdiction in 1976.  As is evident, weighting does not have a substantial effect on the magnitude 
of the estimates.   
Column (3) presents estimates from a model that controls for time effects as well as 
arbitration window and city fixed-effects.  As in the statistical models that were used to construct 
Figures 2 and 3, I incorporate a comparison group of 197 cities that never underwent arbitration in 
order to facilitate the estimation of the time effects.  Adding the comparison group and controlling 
for fixed-effects does not change the basic conclusions from the regression-unadjusted specifications: 
that police wins are associated with increases in clearances after arbitration, while police losses are 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Estimates are robust to the use of alternative arbitration windows. 
13 One reason that it takes a few months for this difference to emerge may be that it takes time to develop cases 
leading to arrest.      
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associated with declines.  Note that because there are no arbitration cases that lead to no decision, it 
is not possible to separately identify the effect of winning in arbitration, losing in arbitration, and 
simply finishing arbitration, irrespective of the outcome.  But while there may be a post-arbitration 
effect on clearances irrespective of the arbitration outcome, it is still possible to identify the effect of 
a police win relative to a police loss.  The fourth row of Table II corresponds to the change in the 
Union/Employer clearance rate differential between the post-arbitration and pre-arbitration periods.  
In column (3) this change is estimated as 15.71 clearances per 100,000 capita with a t-ratio of 4.19.  
This estimate implies that the difference in the number of monthly clearances per 100,000 capita 
between Union and Employer cities widened by 12 percent after arbitration.   
The post-arbitration Union/Employer differentials in clearances are present and roughly of 
the same magnitude for both violent and property crimes (see Table II, columns (4)-(9)).  Table III 
presents estimates of post-arbitration clearance rate differentials by specific crime type.  To the 
extent that officers may exercise discretion on whom to arrest, they do not appear to alter 
enforcement in murder and rape cases following arbitration rulings.  However, arbitration rulings 
have a large effect on clearances of assault and robbery crimes as well as all categories of 
property crimes.   
 
VI. The Effect of Arbitration Rulings on Crime Rates 
Table IV shows that the changes in post-arbitration clearance rates are not being driven by 
changing crime rates.  In fact, clearances and crime rates move in the opposite direction after 
arbitration.  Column (6) shows that post-arbitration months in Employer cities are associated with 
19.86 additional monthly property crimes per 100,000 capita (t-ratio = 1.78), whereas union 
arbitration wins are not associated with a significant change in the property crime rate following 
arbitration.  There appears to be no relationship, however, between the arbitration decision and the 
violent crime rate.  Some caution is warranted in interpreting the estimates for the reported crime 
outcome, since they are measured somewhat imprecisely.  While the difference-in-difference 
estimate of the effect of a union arbitration win relative to a union arbitration loss is fairly large,  
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estimated as -15.46 in column (6), it is imprecise, having a standard error of 13.96.  Nevertheless, the 
point estimates suggest the effect of an arbitration loss on the number of crimes cleared by arrest will 
in fact be larger in magnitude than the estimates reported in Table II, as, mechanically, police make 
more clearances when crime rates are higher.   
To better assess the relationship between arbitration outcome and the per capita crime rate in 
the months after arbitration, I construct figures plotting the cumulative effect of arbitration rulings on 
reported crime over event time.  A cumulative plot of post-arbitration crime rates for Union cities 
relative to Employer cities, analogous to Figure III, shows that Employer cities experienced elevated 
crime rates in the post-arbitration months relative to Union cities.  However, the confidence interval 
is very wide and the cumulative estimates are never significantly different than zero.  Recalling Table 
IV, however, there is a significant change in the crime rate in Employer cities after arbitration.  
Therefore, it is instructive to make fewer demands on the data and simply plot the cumulative 
difference in Employer city crime rates at each post-arbitration month relative to the average crime 
rate in Employer cities during the entire pre-arbitration period.  To construct this figure, I estimate: 
 
(3)  1,...23   , n EmployerWi UnionWin b b FE = + ∗ + ∗ + + = τ ε θ ξ ψ α τ τ τ τ b mt b mt y . 
For each post-arbitration date I calculate the cumulative excess number of crimes reports up to that 
date in Employer municipalities relative to the average crime rate during the entire pre-arbitration 
period:     
 
  ∑ = =
j
k k j 1
ˆ ˆ θ ω ,  j = 1,….,23. 
Estimates of  j ω ˆ  are plotted in Figure IV for total crime reports.  Inspection of Figure IV shows that 
there were more than 600 excess crime reports per 100,000 capita in Employer cities in the 23 
months after arbitration.  Crime reports appear to rise 5 months after arbitration and are statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the 10 percent level of significance during months 6 through 16.  
The estimates on the crime outcome are additionally interesting from the perspective of the 
economics and crime literature.  A longstanding question is the effect is of increased police presence  
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on crime.  While the point estimates are somewhat imprecise, they suggest that the elasticity of crime 
with respect to clearances is approximately -0.3, assuming that arbitration rulings affect crime only 
through changes in police presence.  This elasticity is in line with the OLS estimates on the elasticity 
of crime with respect to police as reported in Levitt (1997) and McCrary (2002).  The increase in 
crime observed after police arbitration losses may occur either through criminals’ response to the 
reduced presence of police, or through a containment channel—more clearances result in fewer free 
potential criminals.   
The estimate on reported crime due to a losing arbitration outcome can also be used to bound 
how much the employer (taxpayers) are willing to pay in order to reduce crime.  A back-of-the-
envelope calculation implies that the willingness to pay to prevent a single crime is bounded above at 
$487, which is a very low quantity.
14  To put this figure into perspective, assume, as before, that the 
elasticity of crime with respect to police officers is -0.3. In a typical town in the sample, hiring one 
additional police officer at $50,000 per year would result in a decline of 9 crimes, amounting to 
$5,560 per crime prevented.  It may be that the willingness to pay to reduce crime is low because 
most of the excess crimes reported following arbitration losses are property crimes and may be 
relatively minor in nature.  It could also be that city managers failed to recognize the social costs 
associated with police arbitration losses.  If this is the case, then the ratio of the true willingness to 
pay to prevent crime and the one implied by the calculation above may be considered a measure of 
the ignorance of employer negotiators.         
While there were statistically significant increases in reported crime in Employer cities after 
arbitration, as stressed earlier, these change are not statistically distinguishable from the change in 
the crime rate occurring from the pre- to the post-arbitration period in Union cities, which is 
negligible but estimated with large standard errors.  The noisiness that is inherent in the crime 
                                                 
14 We can suppose that a risk-neutral employer compares the expected payoff from entering into arbitration to the 
expected payoff from settling with the union.  Consider the case of a typical town in the sample, which has a 
population of 21,345 and 50 police officers with salaries of $50,000 per year.  Using a probability of a union 
arbitration win of 0.66 if the employer does not settle with the union, it reveals that it is unwilling to pay more than 2 
× wage bill × (union offer – employer offer), or $75,000, in order to prevent 154 crimes from occurring.    
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outcome complicates inference and leads to estimates that are measured imprecisely in some cases.  
Therefore, I will focus primarily on clearances as the outcome of interest in the subsequent analysis.       
    
VII. The Effect of Arbitration Rulings on Sentencing Outcomes 
 
  In this section I ask how arbitration affects defendant outcomes through the courts, focusing 
in particular on the probability of conviction and incarceration and on the sentencing of arrestees.  
These measures are informative of how the “quality” of policing may have changed after arbitration.  
I will consider whether the elevated number of clearances following police arbitration wins is the 
result of police targeting a different mix of crimes depending on the arbitration ruling and whether 
sentencing outcomes of arrestees depends on the arbitration outcome because police collect less 
evidence or present lower quality evidence to the prosecutor following losses.  
Unfortunately, the UCR data does not contain information on the final disposition of the 
arrestee, specifically, whether the arrest resulted in a conviction and, if so, the sentence.  Instead I use 
information from administrative data on information of arrestees from the point of arrest through 
final disposition drawn from the Offender Based Transaction Statistics (OBTS).  This series was 
produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics with the intention of tracking individuals from the point 
of entry into the criminal justice through final disposition.  By matching arrested individuals in the 
OBTS to agencies in the arbitration data files, I can test whether conviction rates, incarceration rates, 
and sentencing depends on the arbitration outcome at the time of arrest.     
The OBTS files include New Jersey for the period 1987-1990, although identifiers for 
arresting agency and month are only available for 1989 and 1990.  Cases in the OBTS are reported 
by date of final disposition.  Data in the 1989 and 1990 files contain individuals who reached their 
final disposition in these two years.  Therefore, for this section I limit the arbitration cases under 
analysis to those for which the first and last month of a (12,12) arbitration window occur between 
1987 and 1990.  This exclusion results in the use of 40 arbitration cases in the analysis.  I match each 
individual to the municipality where he or she was arrested and retain individuals who were arrested 
in the 12 months before or in the 12 months after an arbitration ruling.  Ultimately, I compare  
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sentencing outcomes of individuals who were arrested for felonies in Union and Employer cities 
between 1987 and 1990 and obtained final disposition between 1989 and 1990 in municipalities that 
experienced arbitration between 1988 and 1989.  Because the data files are organized by date of 
disposition, I am necessarily missing defendants who were involved in prolonged trials and whose 
cases may have been relatively serious.  This may present a problem when comparing the pre- to 
post-arbitration periods, since individuals who appear in the dataset and were arrested post-
arbitration will have had their cases disposed relatively quickly as compared to individuals arrested 
in the pre-arbitration period.  However, it is still possible to compare post-arbitration outcomes in 
Union and Employer cities.    
  The OBTS analysis, while limited by the relatively small number of arbitration cases that can 
be used, suggests that the differences in policing activity observed in the post-arbitration period are 
substantive.  Panel A of Table V displays estimates from linear probability models for the probability 
of conviction (columns 1 and 2) and incarceration (columns 3 and 4).  All models in the table include 
controls for demographic information of the defendants, year and season effects, year of final 
disposition dummies, and arbitration window dummies.   
The difference-in-difference estimates on conviction probabilities in columns (1) and (2) 
show that the probability of conviction for individuals arrested in Union cities did not change from 
the pre- to the post-arbitration period relative to Employer cities.  These estimates suggest that the 
rising number of arrests in Union municipalities following arbitration is not the result of police 
arresting the innocent.  Defendants who were arrested after an arbitration decision were no less likely 
to be convicted if the arbitrator ruled in favor of the police relative to when the arbitrator ruled 
against the police.     
The estimates in column (3) of Panel A indicate that defendants arrested following union 
wins were more likely to be incarcerated as compared to defendants arrested after union losses.  In 
column (3), the probability of incarceration increased by 0.076 points in Union cities relative to 
Employer cities in the 12 months after arbitration relative to the 12 months before arbitration.  This 
estimate has a t-ratio of 3.55 and corresponds to approximately a 22 percent increase in the  
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incarceration probability in Union cities from the pre- to the post-arbitration period relative to the 
change in the incarceration probability in Employer cities.  The effect of arbitration on the 
incarceration outcome is large and suggests that there were important differences in policing 
strategies depending on the arbitration outcome in the cities in this sample.  One reason that there 
could be such a large increase in the probability of incarceration is that police in Employer cities 
shifted their arrests towards less-serious offenders.  However, when conditioning on charged offense 
categories in column (4), the difference-in-difference estimate of a union win versus a union loss 
declines by only 0.022 points.  It appears that defendants in Union cities have a higher incarceration 
probability for a given crime charged suggesting that, perhaps, police collected less evidence, or 
provided less evidence to prosecutors, following arbitration losses. 
 
VIII. Employment, Overtime and Turnover 
The observed changes in clearance and crime rates after arbitration are not the result of 
changes in the number of police.  Table VI shows that employment at Union cities did not change 
significantly relative to employment in Employer cities in the year after arbitration, relative to the 
year before.  In this table I make pre- and post-arbitration comparisons of the employment of police 
officers and civilian personnel in cities that experienced FOA.  The difference in Union and 
Employer employment is virtually unchanged in the year after arbitration relative to the year before 
arbitration.  The difference-in-difference is estimated as 0.07 with a standard error of 3.56 in column 
(2).  Interestingly, column (5) suggests that there were 5.5 additional civilian personnel per 100,000 
capita after arbitration in Employer departments, with a corresponding t-ratio of 1.90, although the 
difference-in-difference, -5.66, is estimated quite imprecisely with a standard error of 4.19.  The 
interaction of the arbitration outcomes with an indicator that takes on the value of one if the 
population of the city at the time of arbitration is at or above the 75
th percentile of the population 
distribution in the sample reveal no differences in post-arbitration employment of police officers or 
of civilian personnel even in large cities.   
It is possible, though, that, in response arbitration rulings, police officers change their labor 
supply decision at the intensive margin, for example through changing overtime hours.  In fact, this  
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may be a mechanism through which the observed changes in performance measures from the pre- to 
post-arbitration period may occur.  However, basic economic theory would not predict that these 
changes in overtime hours supplied by officers are the rational response to changing prices.  If the 
labor demand curve is downward sloping, then the increase in wages associated with a union win 
would lead the municipal employer to cut overtime hours, resulting in fewer clearances, in contrast to 
what actually occurs.  Additionally, all of the arbitration cases involved nominal pay raises, and most 
involved real pay raises.  If the patterns seen in the data were the result of a change in the labor 
supply of police officers at the intensive margin in response to the changes in the wage, then it would 
have to be the case that, on average, the substitution effect dominates the income effect when police 
win in arbitration, but the income effect dominates when police lose.  Such behavior would be 
unusual.   
Two additional mechanisms that may account for post-arbitration changes in productivity 
are increased turnover and adverse selection of officers following union losses.
15  There are 
several reasons why these mechanisms fail to explain the patterns in clearance rates seen in the 
data.  First, the turnover rate of police officers is typically low, as compared to other 
occupations; typical officers have 10 years of seniority [Aamodt 2004].  Second, collective 
bargaining agreements would not permit a city to substitute higher for lower skilled officers.  If 
the increase in clearances following police wins is coming from new and relatively skilled 
recruits, these recruits would have to fill existing vacancies.  But, as already mentioned, there is 
no evidence that employment levels changed after arbitration.  Finally, police are highly 
responsive to arbitration rulings even though the gaps between the disputing party’s offers are 
often not large, averaging around 1.5 percent.  The pronounced response to arbitration rulings 
                                                 
15 The higher pay that is associated with an arbitration win may lead to reduced turnover, as in Salop [1979], and as 
a result, higher productivity.  In the adverse selection case, arbitration losses may result in a situation where better 
members of police departments leave and are replaced by less skilled officers, as in Weiss [1980].  However, 
McCrary [2003] finds no evidence that the introduction affirmative action quotas in police departments led to 
increases in crime, even though the quotas meant hiring candidates with test scores below what would have been 
acceptable prior to their introduction.      
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with relatively small spreads suggests that psychological factors may have influenced the 
quantity of effort supplied by the officers following arbitration.  I now turn to this question.      
 
IX. Reference Point Comparisons and Police Performance 
In Bewley’s [1999] study, managers report that morale is hurt when pay raises are lower than 
expectations.  The consequences of low morale can be significant, resulting in a mood that is not 
conducive to work and work environments where employees are unwilling to make sacrifices for the 
organization.  Employee reactions to lower than expected pay may represent a response to a 
perceived insult, or simply disappointment.  Under both of these scenarios, productivity depends on 
changes in pay relative to a reference level.  A central goal of this study is to examine whether, in 
fact, the degree to which workers reduce effort following arbitration depends on the size of the loss 
that is incurred.   
 
IX. A. Clearances depend on the comparison of awarded pay to pay demands 
As mentioned in the Introduction, determining whether productivity depends on pay raises in 
relation to a reference point is typically challenging because reference points are unobserved.  A 
natural reference point candidate is the “fair wage,” or what other police officers earn in similar 
circumstances.  Such a wage may be difficult to calculate because, to do so, one must have the same 
information on police performance and city characteristics that was available to the parties at the time 
of arbitration, or some notion of the right comparison city.  However, because information on each 
party’s offer in arbitration is available, this calculation is unnecessary in this case.  Unions engage in 
arbitration precisely because, from their point of view, the employer’s offer is not the fair offer.  
Therefore, in the case of a union loss, the gap between the union’s demand and the award (the 
employer’s offer) is a measure of the degree of the loss.  A simple test of whether comparisons of 
pay to reference points affect police performance is to determine whether reductions in clearances 
following arbitration become more pronounced as the gap between the union demand and the 
arbitrator award widens.  Such a finding would suggest that counterfactuals, which have no material 
effect on the police officers, affect workplace behavior.    
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A convenient way to implement the test is to plot the relationship between post-arbitration 
changes in performance and the deviation of the award from the average of the offers.  This way, one 
can see how performance responds to both the distance between the union demand and the award, in 
the case of a police loss, and the distance between the award and the employer offer, in the case of a 
police win.
16  In Figure V, I examine this relationship.  For each of the 383 arbitration cases, I 
calculate the change in the average clearance rate from the 12 months before to the 12 months after 
arbitration.  I then non-parametrically estimate the expected change in clearances conditional on the 
distance of the arbitrator award to the average of the final offers, allowing for a break at zero, using a 
local linear smoother.  I term this conditional expectation the “effort-response” function. 
The effort-response function provides support for the reference point hypothesis.  In 
interpreting Figure V it is useful to note that when the award is greater than the average of the final 
offers the union has won arbitration, and when the award is lower than the average of the final offers 
the employer has won arbitration.  The noteworthy feature of this plot is that when police lose in 
arbitration there is a pronounced positive relationship between the distance of the award from the 
average of the final offers and the change in clearances following arbitration.  This relationship 
indicates that police effort following arbitration depends on the gap between the pay raise that the 
union demanded in negotiations and the actual award.   
Theories of reference-dependent preferences emphasize that losses resonate more than gains 
[Kahneman and Tversky 1979].  If the observed positively sloped effort-response function occurring 
when police lose has a psychological explanation, as would be the case if comparisons of awards to 
reference points lead police to reduce performance due to considerations of fairness or 
disappointment, then we should expect this function to flatten when the award meets or exceeds the 
reference point, in other words, when police win.  Indeed, the figure shows that as the difference 
between the award and the average of the offers crosses the zero threshold, there is a marked jump in 
the effort-response function, but the slope of the curve flattens considerably. 
                                                 
16  Another way to think about this approach, from the theoretical perspective, is that the arbitrator forms a preferred (fair) offer 
by determining what other police forces would earn in similar cities.  In expectation, the average of the parties equilibrium offers  
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Column (1) of Table VII confirms that the degree of loss is strongly related to the change in 
post-arbitration clearances in a parametric model with covariates.  This column presents estimates 
from a parsimonious parameterization of the effort-response function:   
 (4)  cb mt b mt y τ τ τ τ ε δ δ ψ α + × + + + = ) SIZE    LOSS post ( post b 2 1 FE , 
where LOSS SIZE = (union demand – arbitrator award).  The estimate on the coefficient on LOSS 
SIZE is -10.31, with a t-ratio of 6.49, signifying that the gap between the award and the union 
demand has a very strong relationship to the change in the post-arbitration clearance rate.
17  This 
relationship implies that if two unions each receive a 5 percent raise, but one asked for 15 percent 
while the other asked for 6 percent then, ceteris paribus, the union that demanded the smaller amount 
will clear approximately 90 more crimes per 100,000 capita each month following arbitration than 
the union that demanded a larger raise.   
The flat portion of the effort-response function in Figure V, when the award exceeds the 
average of the offers, suggests that the size of the award alone does not drive post-arbitration 
productivity.  Formally, I make this inference by regressing the per capita clearance rate on a post-
arbitration dummy and a post-arbitration dummy interacted with the size of the award.  The second 
and third columns of Table VII show that the estimated coefficient on this interaction is small in 
magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Police receiving larger pay raises are not 
exerting more effort than those receiving smaller pay raises following arbitration.  The mechanism 
underlying the post-arbitration effects is clearly more complicated than a simple effort/wage 
relationship.  At first blush, this conclusion may be considered to be at odds with the results showing 
that there are positive productivity effects arising from union wins.  In fact, the positive productivity 
effect following union wins comes about from the jump in the effort-response function at the point 
where the difference in the award and the average of the offers is zero.  This discontinuous jump in 
                                                                                                                                                             
is the arbitrator’s preferred award.   
17 In New Jersey, the spread in offers has declined over time and, consequently, the results can also be interpreted as 
capturing a downward trend in the magnitude of post-arbitration productivity declines in Employer cities across 
arbitration years.  While it is not possible to completely discount this possibility, I have experimented with the 
inclusion of interacting post arbitration × Employer Win and post arbitration × Union Win with time trends, which 
do not qualitatively change the results of Table VII.   
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the effort-response function, which I will term the “Vince Lombardi” effect, suggests that losing 
arbitration affects productivity, even when the stakes are trivially small and may be indicative of a 
“warm glow” that comes from winning arbitration or a cloud that comes from losing.
18     
In order to estimate the Lombardi effect, I fit a model that allows post-arbitration 
productivity to depend on a cubic term in the size of the loss and an indicator for whether there as a 
police win: 
 
(5)  cb mt b mt y τ τ τ τ τ ε ρ ρ ψ α + × + × + + + = )) SIZE    LOSS ( p post ( UnionWin post post b b 2 1 FE , 
 
where p(LOSS SIZEb) denotes a cubic polynomial in LOSS SIZE.  The coefficient  2 ρ  determines 
the change in performance when the loss size is zero and the police win in arbitration, relative to 
when the loss size is zero and the police lose in arbitration.  If  2 ρ  is positive, then winning in 
arbitration increases clearances even if the difference between the offers is trivially small.  In column 
(4) of Table VII, the Lombardi effect is estimated as 13.38, with a t-ratio of 2.52.  This estimate 
suggests that police incorporate reference points which are based on categories (win versus loss) as 
well as pay.  However, this result must be interpreted with some care.  As noted earlier, because there 
are no arbitration cases that lead to no-decision, it is not possible to disentangle the effect of an 
arbitration win, arbitration loss, and simply finishing arbitration.  Therefore, while the Lombardi 
effect shows that winning is important, it should be interpreted as the productivity response of a win 
in relation to a loss.  For example, it could be that losing in arbitration leads to productivity declines, 
wining arbitration does not lead to productivity gains, while just finishing arbitration leads to gains in 
productivity.  In this case, the Lombardi effect reflects the productivity decline associated with a 
small loss. 
 
IX. B. Expectation-Based Counterfactuals 
There is considerable support in the psychology literature for the idea that comparisons to 
expectation-based counterfactuals matter for emotional responses to outcomes and decisions.
19  The 
                                                 
18 Professional football coach Vince Lombardi is attributed to have said that “winning isn’t everything, it’s the only  
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pain or pleasure following an outcome depends on the utility of the outcome, comparisons of actual 
to counterfactual outcomes, and the surprise associated with the actual outcome.  For example, if the 
employees propose a pay raise that has no chance of selection, then they may not react as adversely 
as in the case that the proposed pay raise has a positive probability of selection.  A structured way to 
account for both anticipation and the gap between the award and the union demand is to model police 
performance as depending on the difference between the award and the rationally expected award, 
where the expected award depends on the probabilities of winning and the offers presented.  This 
specification is in line with the modeling approach of Koszegi and Rabin’s [2005] who argue that 
reference points are best thought of as rational expectations.  Taking this line of thought seriously, I 
can use variation in the probability of employer wins across arbitration cases to test whether 
deviations in the arbitrator award from the expected award can account for differences in post-
arbitration relative to pre-arbitration clearance rates, even after controlling for the distance between 
the union demand and the arbitrator award. 
Divergent beliefs, political economy, differences in degrees of risk-aversion across parties, 
changes in arbitrator behavior over time, and mental rigidity in negotiations are all reasons that may 
lead parties to submit offers with varying probabilities of selection.  If parties vary in the 
conservativeness of their offers, then the probability of winning will vary across cases as well.  If this 
is the case, then the mean of the final-offers can be used to predict the probability of an employer 
win, as noted by Ashenfelter and Bloom [1984].  Conditional on the facts of the case, the higher the 
average of the offers, the higher is the probability of employer selection.  Following Ashenfelter and 
Bloom’s [1984] and Ashenfelter and Dahl’s [2005] approach, if one assumes that the arbitrator’s 
preferred award is normally distributed, then the probability of employer selection is a probit 
function depending of the average of the offers.  Therefore, the starting point for this analysis is to 
estimate the predicted probability of employer arbitration wins using a probit model, using as an 
explanatory variable the average of the final offers.  Using these predicted probabilities, I calculate 
                                                                                                                                                             
thing.” 
19 For example, see Mellers et al. [1999].  
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the expected award for each arbitration case: expected awardb = b p ˆ employer offerb+ ) ˆ 1 ( b p − union 
offerb, where  b p ˆ  is the predicted probability of an employer win in arbitration case b.  I then 
construct the difference between the expected award and the arbitrator award.   
For ease of exposition, in the context of a union loss I will call the gap between the union 
demand and the award the “loss size,” and the gap between the expected offer and the award the 
“deviation from expectation.”  The finding presented in column (5) of Table VII is that, in cases of 
union losses, when both the loss size and the deviation from expectation are included in the model 
(after being interacted with a post-arbitration dummy), the deviation from expectation explains 
substantially more of the variation in the magnitude of the post-arbitration declines in clearances than 
the loss size.  In fact, loss size has no significant relationship to clearances after controlling for the 
deviation from the expected award.  The reason that the coefficient on the loss size is large in column 
(1), but is virtually zero in column (5), is that the loss size and the deviation from the expected award 
are highly correlated.  The deviation from the expected award captures both the notion that some 
awards are more anticipated than others and the size of the loss.  The effect of a union arbitration loss 
on clearances is greater both when the union offer is far from the employer offer and when there is 
greater anticipation of a union win.  If the union submits an offer that is very large but has a low 
probability of being selected, then the productivity response will be limited.
20  These findings 
validate the idea that effort depends on the degree to which pay raises fall below expectations, in this 
case rational expectations.  By contrast, when the pay raise exceeds expectations, there is no 
statistically distinguishable effect on the performance of police officers, as seen in column (6).  The 
lack of a relationship in this case signifies that loss aversion is an important determinant of 




                                                 
20 Another way to understand this finding is that the degree to which a loss affects performance is effectively 
mediated by the size of the offer.  Large losses, which occur when the gap between the union demand and the award 
is large, do not hurt as much when the average of the offers is sizable relative to when the average is smaller.  
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IX. C. Adaptation and Dynamics 
An important aspect of the findings that remains to be discussed concerns the productivity 
dynamics following arbitration.  Figure I shows that the productivity effects arising from arbitration 
decisions are persistent, peaking at seven months following arbitration, and appearing to reach a new 
steady-state after about a year.  It is useful to interpret these dynamics though the lens of the theory 
of the “hedonic treadmill,” which holds that subjective well-being (SWB) adjusts to current 
circumstances [Brickman and Campbell (1971)].  This proposition implies that life events induce 
transitory deviations of SWB from baseline levels.  How quickly SWB returns to baseline following 
an event depends on the kind of event considered and the research design of the study.  Studies of 
lottery winners [Brickman et al. 1978] and people with severe spinal cord injuries [Silver 1982] show 
that adaptation to these extreme life-events occurs within a short time-frame, typically within a year.  
By contrast, a more recent literature has found that repeated spells of unemployment [Lucas et al. 
2004] and changes in martial status [Lucas et al. 2003] appear to have long-lasting effects on life 
satisfaction.  Nevertheless, it may be considered puzzling that people adapt to some major life events 
relatively quickly, but the reduced performance of police officers following an arbitration loss 
persists for over a year.  One important difference between the context of this study and the ones 
reviewed above is that, in this study, police reactions to adverse or positive events may have been 
augmented by social interactions.  The literature on group polarization suggests that members of 
group discussions advocate more extreme positions than individuals who do not participate in group 
discussion.  Additionally, if there are strong feedback effects in the transmission of job satisfaction 
across individuals due to social interactions, one-time shocks to morale may, in theory, be highly 
persistent.     
 
X. Conclusion 
Arbitration systems offer a rich setting to study how workers respond to relative changes in 
compensation.  The advantage of the approach taken in this paper is multifold.  First, information on 
both the enacted offers and the counter-offers allow me to explore how deviations from reference  
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payoffs affect productivity.  Second, theoretical models of final-offer arbitration suggest that 
arbitration rulings are orthogonal to the facts of the case because the information that is relevant to 
compensation is already incorporated into the final offers.  In addition, the statistical models are 
flexible and the parameters of interest are identified even if the arbitrator draws from the information 
set available to him or her at the time of arbitration.  Lastly, high frequency data on clearances allows 
me to capture dynamics in performance that may not be detected using more coarse time intervals.   
It is well known that final-offer arbitration awards are low quality because they lie 
outside the range of negotiated settlements.  This study shows that final-offer arbitration can 
have additional inefficiencies arising from the behavioral response of participants to unfavorable 
outcomes.  Ichniowski [1982] finds that arbitration helps reduce the propensity for police to strike, 
which suggests that police departments in contract disputes not subject to compulsory arbitration 
could, in principle, experience productivity losses that are even more sizable than the ones presented 
in this paper.   
The findings in this paper suggest several avenues for future work.  First, additional work 
needs to be done to determine whether productivity responses to arbitration are exacerbated by 
the fact that the arbitration rulings in this paper represent group level outcomes.  That is, are the 
effects of falling below a reference point amplified when the resulting disappointment affects an 
entire group of workers?  Second, models of final offer arbitration can be written to take into 
account the effect of differential rulings on productivity.  For example, a question that arises is 
whether employers manage expectations of workers to minimize the behavioral costs arising 
from unfavorable payoffs.  In some cases, it may be optimal for employers engaged in final offer 
arbitration to increase expected productivity by making offers that arbitrators are unlikely to 
select.  Such behavior could be one reason why employer win rates are fairly low in this study.  
Lastly, future studies should consider whether the behavioral responses associated with 
differential arbitration outcomes, as outlined in this study, represent a general phenomenon  
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relating to allocative mechanisms that clearly demarcate winners from losers, for example 





NJ PERC:   
The data provide information on FOA cases that took place in New Jersey between 1978 
and 1995 and include information on the offers submitted to the arbitrator, which are expressed 
as percent changes on the previous contract’s wage, and information on whether the arbitrator 
ruled in favor of the municipal employer or police bargaining unit.  
 
FBI UCR:  
I match arbitration to monthly clearance and crime data from the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reporting System (UCR) data files obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (ICPSR) for 1975 through 1996.  The data files include reports by police 
departments on felony crimes and clearances.  Datasets were matched on the name of the 
municipality.  This merge was complicated because reporting of municipal names was not 
uniform in the NJ PERC data file and the UCR files and because there are multiple cities in New 
Jersey with the same name.  For example, New Jersey has five Washington Townships and a 
Washington Borough.  In such cases I used additional information, like county and census 
population size, to match the cities.  Several municipalities that did undergo arbitration are 
dropped from the analysis because they lie too close to one another, resulting in overlapping 
event-study windows.  The exact number depends on the length of the arbitration window and 
the rules used to determine eligibility for inclusion in cases with overlapping windows is 
described below.  There are an additional 104 arbitration cases on non-compensation disputes 
that are not used in the main analysis.  One arbitration case is dropped because the city never  
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reported to the FBI in the period of arbitration.  After these exclusions, 383 arbitration cases 
remain.   
As described in the text, I include a comparison group consisting of municipalities that 
never underwent arbitration.  There are 211 municipalities that never arbitrated with police 
unions between 1978 and 1995.  In order to preserve a balanced panel for the comparison group, 
I only include cities that missed reporting to the FBI in at most 10 percent of months.  This filter 
results in the use of 197 municipalities in the comparison group.  The results are robust to 
different selection rules.       
 
Selection of cases with overlapping windows: 
I employ the following selection rules when arbitration windows overlap: 
(i)  Exclude an arbitration window if the arbitration date falls on the post-arbitration  
            period of another case (in the same city).   
(ii)  If the arbitration date in case A falls on the pre-arbitration window of case B, then 
only exclude months in A’s window that overlap with the post-arbitration months 
of case B.  By the previous rule, case B is excluded.      
(iii)  If the post-arbitration months in A overlap with the pre-arbitration months in B, 
then keep A and exclude B. 
One may be concerned that in dropping only part of an arbitration window, I allow for 
the possibility of composition bias since some arbitration windows will be truncated.  However, 
dropping incomplete bargaining windows does not qualitatively change the estimates, nor do 
specifications that control for arbitration window fixed-effects, which control for permanent 
differences in cities around the time of arbitration.  
 
OBTS Datafile: 
File consists of individuals who were arrested for felonies between 1987 and 1990 and 
obtained final disposition between 1989 and 1990 in municipalities that experienced arbitration  
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between 1988 and 1989.  There are 40 arbitration cases used in this analysis.  For the sentence 
outcome, 13 offenders who received the death penalty were dropped from the sample.  If the 
same offender appears more than once in the data, only the first offense is used.  Offenders with 
a missing offense code or conviction code are dropped from the sample.  Sentence is the 
maximum length of the jail sentence imposed for an offense expressed in fractions of a year.  
OBTS are available from ICPSR.   
 




Aamodt, Michael, “Law Enforcement Selection: Research Summaries,” (Washington, DC:  
Police Executive Research Forum, 2004).  
 
Adams, J. Stacy, “Inequity in Social Exchange,”  in L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, Volume 2 (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1965).  
 
Agell, Jonas and Per Lundborg, “Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence from 
Swedish Manufacturing Firms,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics XCVII (1995), 
1027-1039.   
 
Akerlof, George and Jenet Yellen, “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics CV (1990): 255-283. 
Ashenfelter, Orley, “Arbitrator Behavior,” American Economic Review LXXVII (1987), 
342-346. 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley and David Bloom, “Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence,” 
American Economic Review LXXIV (1984), 111-124.     
 
Ashenfelter, Orley and Gordon Dahl, “Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and 
the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration,” Industrial 
Relations Section, Princeton University, February 2005.   
 
Bateman, Ian; Alistair Munroe; Bruce Rhodes; Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden, “Does Part-




Bewley, Truman, Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999.  
 
Blinder, Alan and Don Choi, “A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics CV (1990), 1003-1015.     
 
Brickman, Philip and Don Campbell, “Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society,” in 
M.H. Appley (Ed.), Adaptation-level theory, New York: Academic Press, 1971, 287-305. 
 
Brickman, Philip; Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, “Lottery Winners and Accident 
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology XXXVI 
(1978), 917-927. 
 
Brown, Gordon D. A.; Jonathan Gardner; Andrew Oswald and Jing Qian, “Does Wage Rank 
Affect Employees' Wellbeing?” (2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1505. 
 
Cappelli, Peter and Keith Chauvin, “An Inter-Plant Test of Efficiency Wage Arguments,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXIII (1991), 769-787.  
 
Fehr, Ernst and Gächter, Simon, “Fairness and Retaliation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
LXXIII (2000), 159-182. 
 
Farber, Henry, “An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration,” Journal of Conflict Resolution XXIV 
(1980), 683-705. 
 
Gibbons, Robert, “Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration,” American Economic Review 
LXXVIII (1988), 896-912. 
 
Gul, Faruk, “A Theory of Disappointment Aversion,” Econometrica LIX (1991), 667-686. 
 
Ichniowski, Casey, “Arbitration and Police Bargaining: Prescriptions for the Blue Flu,” 
Industrial Relations XXI (1982), 149-166.   
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 
Econometrica XLVII (1979), 263-291. 
 
Kaufman, Roger, “On Wage Stickiness in Britain’s Competitive Sector,” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, XXII (1984), 101-112.   
 
Koszegi, Botand and Mathew Rabin, “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Forthcoming.  
 
Lester, Richard, Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government, Industrial Relations Section, 
Princeton University, 1984.     
  
  32
Levitt, Steven, “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on 
Crime,” American Economic Review LXXXVII (1997), 270-290.   
 
Lucas, Richard; Andrew Clark; Yannis Georgellis and Ed Diener, “Reexamining Adaptation and 
the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology LXXXIV (2003), 527-539. 
 
Lucas, Richard; Andrew Clark; Yannis Georgellis and Ed Diener, “Unemployment Alters the Set 
Point for Life Satisfaction,” Psychological Science XV (2004), 8-13. 
 
McCrary, Justin, “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on 
Crime: Comment,”  American Economic Review XCII (2002), 1236-1243. 
 
McCrary, Justin, “The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition and Quality of  
Police,” University of Michigan.  2003.   
 
Mellers, Barbara; Schwartz, Alan and Ilana Ritov, “Emotion-Based Choice,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General CXXVIII (1999), 332-345. 
 
Rizzo, John and Richard Zeckhauser, “Reference Incomes, Loss Aversion, and Physician 
Behavior,” The Review of Economics and Statistics LXXXV (2003), 909-922.    
 
Salop, Steven, C., “A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment,” American Economic 
Review LXIX (1979), 117-125. 
 
Silver, Ruth, “Coping with an Undesirable Life Event: A Study of Early Reactions to Physical 
Disability,” Northwestern University, (1982). 
 
Thaler, Richard, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,” Journal of Behavior and 
Organization I (1980), 36-60. 
 
Verhoogen, Eric; Stephen Burks and Jeffrey Carpenter, “Fairness and Freight-Handlers: Local 
Labor Market Conditions, Wage Fairness Perceptions, and Employee Performance in a 
Trucking Firm,” Columbia University, (2003).  
 
Weiss, Andrew, “Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages,” Journal of 

























Arbitrator rules for employer  0.344      
Final Offer: Employer  6.11  6.44  5.94  0.50 
 [1.65]  [1.54]  [1.68]  (0.18) 
Final Offer: Union  7.65  7.87  7.54  0.32 
 [1.71]  [2.03]  [1.51]  (0.18) 
Population 21,345  22,893  20,534  2,358 
 [33,463]  [34,561]  [32,915]  (3,598) 
Contract length  2.09  2.09  2.09  0.007 
 [0.66]  [0.64]  [0.66]  (0.071) 
Size of bargaining unit  42.58  41.36  43.22  -1.86 
 [97.34]  [53.33]  [113.84]  (15.66) 
Arbitration year  85.56  85.85  85.41  0.436 
 [4.75]  [5.10]  [4.56]  (0.510) 
Clearances 120.31  122.28  118.57  3.71 
per 100,000 capita  [106.65]  [108.76]  [104.35]  (9.46) 
Violent crime clearances  64.79  65.29  63.16  2.14 
per 100,000 capita  [71.28]  [72.64]  [66.79]  (6.11) 
Property crime clearances  55.51  56.99  55.42  1.57 
per 100,000 capita  [58.72]  [58.61]  [61.43]  (4.92) 
Crime reports  444.03  453.06  439.75  13.30 
per 100,000 capita  [364.23]  [411.99]  [309.80]  (35.92) 
Violent crime reports  95.49  95.31  92.90  2.41 
per 100,000 capita  [103.16]  [101.78]  [98.61]  (9.44) 
Property crime reports  348.45  357.65  346.72  10.93 
per 100,000 capita  [292.10]  [335.62]  [242.84]  (28.71) 
Number of arbitration cases  383  132  251   
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard deviation are in brackets.  In the full sample, observations are municipality × 
month cells for the 12 months before and the 12 months after arbitration.  The offers are percentage changes from wages in the 
previous contract.  t-tests involving time-invariant city characteristics in column (4) are conducted on month only.  For other 
characteristics, namely clearance and crime rates, t-tests are conducted by regressing the characteristic on a employer win 
indicator on all pre-arbitration months while employing robust standard errors that are clustered within the arbitration window.  
The full-sample in column (1) contains 9,538 observations.  There are 210 arbitration cases missing information on number of 
police officers in unit.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal clearance and 









Event study estimates of the effect of arbitration rulings on clearances;   
-12 to +12 month event time window 
    All clearances  Violent crime clearances  Property crime clearances
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant  118.57  141.25   63.16  75.10  55.42  66.15  
  (5.12)  (9.94)  (3.13)  (6.86)  (2.88)  (4.55)  
Post-arbitration    -6.79 -8.48 -9.75 -2.54 -3.10 -3.77 -4.26 -5.39 -4.45 
×  Employer  win  (2.62) (2.20) (2.70) (1.75) (1.35) (1.78) (1.62) (2.25) (1.87) 
Post-arbitration    4.99 7.92 5.96 4.17 5.62 5.31  0.819  2.31 2.19 
×  Union  win  (2.09) (2.91) (2.65) (1.53) (1.95) (1.42) (1.24) (1.58) (1.37) 
Row 3 – Row 2  11.78  16.40  15.71  6.71  8.71  9.08  5.08  7.69  6.40 
  (3.35) (3.65) (3.75) (2.32) (2.37) (2.26) (2.04) (2.75) (2.30) 
Employer  Win  3.71  -2.81  2.14  -5.73  1.57  2.92  
(Yes  =  1)  (9.46)  (14.92)   (6.11)  (9.53)  (4.93)  (7.51)  
           
Fixed-effects?     Yes    Yes    Yes 
 
Weighted  sample?   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Augmented sample?     Yes    Yes    Yes 
           
Mean of the   120.31  120.31  130.82  64.79  64.79  72.15  55.51  55.51  58.63 
Dependent variable  [106.65]  [106.65] [370.58] [71.28]  [71.28]  [294.78] [58.72]  [58.72]  [180.55] 
 
Sample Size  9,538  9,538 59,137 9,538  9,538 59,135 9,538  9,538 59,136 
R
2 0.0008  0.005  0.63  0.0007  0.0078  0.59  0.001  0.0015  0.55 
 
Standard errors, clustered on the intersection of arbitration window and city, are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in 
brackets.  The dependant variable is clearances per 100,000 capita.  When indicated, the sample is weighted by population size in 
1976. Observations are municipality × month cells.  There are 383 arbitration cases under analysis.  The samples in models (1), (2), 
(4), (5), (7), and (8) consist of municipalities that underwent arbitration, limited to months that are in the arbitration window—12 
months after and 12 months before arbitration.  The remaining models augment that sample with data on 197 municipalities that 
never underwent arbitration with police departments over wage disputes in the sample period.  These additional municipalities are 
included for all months between 1976 and 1996.  The employer-win main-effect is absorbed by the arbitration window dummies and 
is therefore omitted from models (3), (6), and (9).  “Fixed-effects” consist of month × year effects (252), arbitration window effects 
(383), and city effects (452).  All models include a constant.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to 

























Event study estimates of the effect of arbitration rulings on clearances by specific crime 





































Post-arbitration    -0.042  -0.075 -4.82 -0.376 -1.25 -0.156 -3.04 
×  Employer  win  (0.064) (0.091)  (1.41)  (0.194) (0.589) (0.156)  (1.53) 
Post-arbitration   -0.011  -0.043  2.67  1.16  0.551  0.271  1.37 
×  Union  win  (0.057) (0.132)  (1.51)  (0.536) (0.527) (0.237)  (1.20) 
 
Row 2 – Row 1  0.030  0.033 7.48  1.53  1.80 0.428 4.41 
  (0.087) (0.160)  (2.03)  (0.582) (0.778) (0.278)  (1.92) 
 
Mean of the Dependant   0.184 1.15 68.83 1.98 13.74 3.85 41.05 
Variable  [3.33]  [26.53] [288.31] [30.69] [110.82] [56.25] [123.58] 
         
Sample Size  59,137  59,135  59,137 59,137 59,136 59,137 59,137 
R
2  0.11 0.18 0.56 0.65 0.20 0.13 0.60 
 
Standard errors, clustered on the intersection of arbitration window and city, are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in 
brackets.  Observations are municipality × month cells.  The sample is weighted by population size in 1976.  There are 383 
arbitration cases under analysis.  The sample is municipalities that underwent arbitration, limited to months that are within the 
arbitration window, augmented with 197 municipalities that never underwent arbitration.  Municipalities that never underwent 
arbitration are included for all months between 1976 and 1996.  All models include month × year effects (252), arbitration window 
effects (383), and city effects (452).  All models include a constant.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases 
























Event study estimates of the effect of arbitration rulings on crime;  
-12 to +12 month event time window 
    All crime  Violent crime  Property crime 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant 612.18    150.26  461.81  
 (63.98)    (23.23)  (42.00)  
Post-arbitration   26.86  24.68  7.75  4.87  19.19  19.86 
× Employer win  (25.29)  (14.68)  (7.85)  (4.70)  (18.17)  (11.19) 
Post-arbitration   7.64  6.68  7.07  2.49  0.170  4.40 
× Union win  (16.24)  (11.42)  (5.46)  (4.46)  (11.68)  (7.87) 
Row 3 – Row 2  -19.21  -18.01  -0.68  -2.38  -19.02  -15.46 
 (30.06)  (19.12)  (9.56)  (6.63)  (21.60)  (13.96) 
Employer  Win  -31.81  -20.43  -11.35  
(Yes  =  1)  (84.42)  (27.57)  (59.50)  
            
Fixed-effects?       Yes    Yes    Yes 
            
Mean of the  444.03  519.42  95.49  98.26  348.45  421.28 
dependent variable  [364.23]  [2037.4]  [103.16]  [363.76]  [292.10]  [1865.8] 
 
Sample size  9,528  59,060  9,529  59,085  9,537  59,119 
R
2 0.001  0.54  0.007  0.76  0.0003  0.42 
 
Standard errors, clustered on the intersection of arbitration window and city, are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in 
brackets.  Observations are municipality × month cells.  The dependent variables are crime reports per 100,000 capita.  The sample is 
weighted by population size in 1976.  There are 383 arbitration cases under analysis.  The sample is municipalities that underwent 
arbitration, limited to months that are within the arbitration window, augmented with 197 municipalities that never underwent 
arbitration.  Municipalities that never underwent arbitration are included for all months between 1976 and 1996.  “Fixed-effects” 
consist of month × year effects (252), arbitration window effects (383), and city effects (452).  All models include a constant.  
Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal clearance rates at the jurisdiction level from 
























Arbitration decisions and sentencing outcomes 
Panel A:  Sentencing 
   OLS: Conviction (Yes = 1)  OLS: Incarceration (Yes = 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Post-arbitration   0.0190  0.0186  -0.0115  -0.0009 
× Employer win  (0.0606)  (0.0328)  (0.0405)  (0.0378) 
Post-arbitration   0.0161  0.0080  0.0645  0.0535 
× Union win  (0.0273)  (0.0238)  (0.0295)  (0.0261) 
Row 2 – Row 1  -0.0028  -0.0106  0.0760  0.0543 
 (0.0599)  (0.0368)  (0.0215)  (0.0226) 
Charge dummies?    Yes    Yes 
Mean of the  0.791  0.791  0.318  0.318 
dependent variable  [0.407]  [0.407]  [0.466]  [0.466] 
N 6,685  6,685  6,685  6,685 
R
2 0.041  0.135  0.050  0.111 
Panel B:  Outcomes conditional on conviction 
   Incarceration (Yes = 1)   Sentence   
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Post-arbitration   -0.0321  -0.0156  -0.1866  0.0878 
× Employer win  (0.0430)  (0.0435)  (0.1629)  (0.1704) 
Post-arbitration   0.0771  0.0722  0.6382  0.4964 
× Union win  (0.0291)  (0.0254)  (0.2234)  (0.1844) 
Row 2 – Row 1  0.1092  0.0878  0.8249  0.4086 
 (0.0250)  (0.0264)  (0.1589)  (0.1277) 
Charge dummies?    Yes    Yes 
Mean of the  0.402  0.402  1.658  1.658 
dependent variable  [0.490]  [0.490]  [3.861]  [3.861] 
Sample Size  5,289  5,289  5,162  5,162 
R
2  0.054 0.128  0.031  0.334 
 
Standard errors, clustered on arbitration window, are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in brackets.  Observations are 
individuals arrested for felonies between 1987 and 1990, obtained final disposition between 1989 and 1990, in municipalities that 
experienced arbitration between 1988 and 1989.  There are 40 arbitration cases used in this analysis.  There are 85 charge 
dummies, which indicate the crime for which the defendant was charged.  All models include a constant, year and month of arrest 
dummies, year of final disposition dummies, and arbitration window dummies.  For the sentence outcome, 13 offenders who 
received the death penalty were dropped from the sample.  If the same offender appears more than once in the data, only the first 
offense is used.  Offenders with a missing offense code or conviction code are dropped from the sample.  Sentence is the 
maximum length of the jail sentence imposed for an offense expressed in fractions of a year.  Conditional on conviction, the 
average sentence is 1.66 years (std. dev. = 3.86).  Conditional on incarceration, the average sentence is 4.28 years (st. dev. = 
5.22).  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration data matched to arrestees from the Offender Based Transaction 










Event study estimates of the effect of arbitration rulings on the number of police officers 





Law enforcement officers 
per 100,000 capita 
Civilian personnel 
per 100,000 capita 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Post Arbitration ×  Employer Win   2.50 0.76  3.16  6.31  5.50  2.97 
    (7.46) (2.78)  (3.49)  (4.27)  (2.90)  (3.25) 
 
Post Arbitration × Union win    -0.87 0.826  -0.66  0.16  -0.16  -0.20 
    (6.78) (2.82)  (2.67)  (2.54)  (1.75)  (2.44) 
 
Row 2 – Row 1    -3.37 0.07   -6.15  -5.66  -3.17 
    (5.90) (3.56)   (2.88)  (4.19)  (3.56) 
 
Employer Win (Yes = 1)    -1.14    3.30     
    (24.85)     (8.39)     
 
Log Population    17.15    1.32     
    (6.43)    (1.35)     
 
Pop 75
th %tile × Post-        -4.06      0.01 
Arbitration × Employer Win       (5.24)      (2.51) 
 
Pop 75
th %tile × Post-        2.31      4.24 
Arbitration × Union Win       (3.82)      (6.45) 
 
Year Dummies {19}    Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Arbitration Window      Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Dummies {338}              
 
Mean of the Dependant     260.78 260.78  260.78  42.77  42.77  42.77 
Variable    [107.79] [107.79]  [107.79] [37.57]  [37.57]  [37.57] 
 
N    676 676  676  676  676  676 
R2    0.18 0.99  0.995  0.11  0.96  0.963 
Notes: Standard errors clustered on arbitration windows are in parentheses.  Standard deviations in brackets. Number of groups in 
braces.  Observations are municipality × year cells corresponding to the year before and the year after arbitration, excluding the 
year of arbitration.  For a given municipality, an arbitration case that occurred within two years of another arbitration case is 
excluded from the sample.  Sample is weighted by 1970 population.  All models estimated with a constant.  Author’s calculation 
based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly employment levels at the jurisdiction level found in FBI Uniform Crime 











Heterogeneous effects of arbitration decisions on clearances by loss size, award, and 














Post-Arbitration 5.72  -8.17  12.99  -7.42  4.97  7.30 
 (2.31) (9.58)  (8.45)  (4.76)  (3.14)  (4.17) 
Post-Arbitration × Award    1.23 -1.00      
    (1.16) (0.98)      
Post-Arbitration × Loss size   -10.31   -10.93    -0.20   
 (1.59)   (1.89)    (4.54)   
Post-Arbitration × Union win       13.38    
      (5.32)    
Post-Arbitration × (expected award-award)        -17.72 2.82 
        (7.94) (4.13) 
Post-Arbitration ×  p(loss size)^       Included   
            
Sample Size  59,137 59,137 59,137  59,137 52,857  55,879 
R
2 0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63 0.60  0.62 
 
Standard errors, clustered on the intersection of arbitration window and city, are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in 
brackets.  Observations are municipality × month cells.  The sample is weighted by population size in 1976.  The dependant 
variable is clearances per 100,000 capita.  Loss size is defined as the union demand (percent increase on previous wage) less the 
arbitrator award.  Amongst cities that underwent arbitration, the mean loss size is 0.489 with a standard deviation of 0.953.  The 
expected award is the mathematical expectation of the award given the union and employer offers and the predicted probability 
of an employer win.  The predicted probability of an employer win is estimated with a probit model using as predictors year of 
arbitration dummies, the average of the final offers, log population, and the length of the contract.  See text for details.  The 
samples in models (1)-(4) consist of the 12 months before to the 12 months after arbitration, for jurisdictions that underwent 
arbitration, as well as all jurisdictions that never underwent arbitration for all months between 1976 and 1996.  The sample in 
model (5) consists of cities where the union lost in arbitration and the comparison group of non-arbitrating cities.  The sample in 
model (6) consists of cities where the union won in arbitration and the comparison group of non-arbitrating cities.  All models 
include month × year effects (252), arbitration window effects (383), and city effects (452).  Author’s calculation based on NJ 
PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal clearance rates at the jurisdiction level from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.    
 















































Month-by-month comparison of Union and Employer city average clearance rates 
 
Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal clearance rates at the jurisdiction 
level from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Sample is weighted by 1976 population.  Data span the years 1976 through 1996 for 




































































Arbitrator ruled for employer






























Regression-adjusted event study estimates of the effect of arbitration rulings on per capita 
clearances 
 
Regression-adjusted estimates based on a regression of clearances per 100,000 capita on event-time dummies interacted with 
indicators for whether the arbitrator ruled in favor of the union or against the union.  Estimates on the interacted event-time 
dummies are plotted relative to the omitted month of arbitration for Union and Employer cities.  Regression model includes 
controls for year × month of arbitration dummies, arbitration window fixed-effects, and city fixed-effects for the group of cities 
that never underwent arbitration.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal 
clearance rates at the jurisdiction level from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Sample is weighted by population in the jurisdiction in 





















































































Regression-adjusted estimates of the cumulative difference in clearances between 
Employer and Union cities in post arbitration months relative to the entire pre-arbitration 
period 
 
Regression-adjusted estimates based on a regression of clearances per 100,000 capita on post-arbitration event-time 
dummies and on post-arbitration event-time dummies interacted with indicators for whether the arbitrator ruled against the union.  
Estimates on the interacted post-arbitration event-time dummies are cumulated and plotted.  Regression model includes controls 
for year × month of arbitration dummies, arbitration window fixed-effects, and city fixed-effects for cities that never underwent 
arbitration.  The dotted lines are the 90 percent confidence interval.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases 
matched to monthly municipal clearance rates at the jurisdiction level from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Sample is weighted by 












































































































Regression-adjusted estimates of the cumulative effect of union losses on crime 
 
Regression-adjusted estimates based on a regression of crimes per 100,000 capita on event-time dummies for the post-
arbitration months interacted with indicators for whether the arbitrator ruled in favor of the union or against the union.  Post-
arbitration event-time dummies interacted with an employer win dummy are cumulated and plotted.  Regression model includes 
controls for year and month of arbitration dummies as well as arbitration window fixed-effects.  Cities that never underwent 
arbitration are also included and are each assigned a fixed-effect.  The dotted lines are the 90 percent confidence interval.  
Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration cases matched to monthly municipal crime rates at the jurisdiction level from 
FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Sample is weighted by population in 1976.  Data span the years 1976 through 1996 for arbitration 
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Estimated expected change in clearances conditional on the deviation of the award from 
the average of the offers 
 
Local-linear estimates of the expected change in clearances conditional on the gap between the arbitrator award and the 
average of the final offers for 383 arbitration cases from the 12 months prior to arbitration to the 12 months after arbitration.  
Dotted-line is the 90 percent confidence band.  Sample is weighted by population in the jurisdiction in 1976.  Data span the years 
1976 through 1996 for arbitration cases occurring between 1978 and 1996.  Author’s calculation based on NJ PERC arbitration 
cases matched to monthly municipal clearance rates at the jurisdiction level from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.       
 